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Scoring methods in multiple−choice tests are usually designed as fair bets, and thus random
guesswork yields zero expected return. This causes the undesired result of forcing risk averse
test−takers to pay a premium in the sense of letting unmarked answers for which they have
partial but not full knowledge. In this note I use a calibrated model of prospect theory
[Tversky and Kahneman (1992, 1995))] to compute a fair rule which is also strategically
neutral, (i.e. under partial knowledge answering is beneficial for the representative calibrated
agent, while under total uncertainty it is not). This rule is remarkably close to an old rule
presented in 1969 by Traub et al. in which there is no penalty for wrong answers but omitted
answers are rewarded by 1/M if M is the number of possible answers.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Multiple-choice tests are often used as an easy and objective way to rank people in examinations.
Examples go from academic exams to achievement or aptitude tests as the SAT (Scholastic Aptitude
Test), or the GRE (Graduate Record Examinations). Beyond the academic world, a quick search
on the internet will show a plethora of organizations and software solutions that can provide on-line
ﬁnancial consulting services which include recruitment tests.
Because the good or bad design of multiple choice tests can have such life-altering consequences
for students, companies, and jobseekers, countless scholars (mostly psychologists or educators) have
dealt extensively with the development and comparison of diﬀerent scoring rules. In particular the
random guessing problem, i.e. the existence of a positive probability of selecting correct answers to
items about which the test taker knows nothing, has inspired a voluminous theoretical and empirical
research.1 About 80 years ago scholars introduced a correction-for-guessing feature, which consists
in the use of scoring formulas under which the respondent’s expected score for an item is the same
whether he omits it or picks one answer from the set of options following a uniform probability
distribution. Implicit in this approach it was assumed that (i) test takers were expected score
maximizers, and (ii) with respect to each item, an examinee either was in a state of absolute
certainty (i.e. a 100% sure of knowing the correct answer) or in a state of total uncertainty (hence,
assigning equal subjective probability to each answer). Insofar as these two assumptions has been
repeatedly challenged on empirical grounds, the so-called correction for guessing has not solved
the problem that motivated it.2 If omitting is a dominated strategy when the scoring rule has
no correction for guessing, facing a guessing correction may discourage answering in situations in
which the respondent has partial knowledge but he is risk averse. As Budescu and Bar-Hillel (1993)
put it:
“Drawing the line between the kind of guessing that should be encouraged (e.g. mining
partial knowledge) and the kind that should, perhaps, not be (e.g. capitalizing on chance)
is very diﬃcult. Moreover, test takers who choose to disregard this distinction cannot
be prevented from doing so” (p. 288).
This paper was the ﬁrst one to suggest only a decade ago a decision-theory analysis of the prob-
lem of guessing in tests. Recently, Bereby-Meyer et al. (2002) have oﬀered the ﬁrst experimental
1 This pure random guessing inﬂates the measurament error of tests, reducing their reliability.
2 This theoretical debate has had practical consequences: SAT exam changed its scoring rule from no penalization
to penalization of wrong answers in 1953, whereas GRE exam took the opposite way in 1984.
1evidence on the existence of framing eﬀects in test taking, a result they link to examinees’ choices
following prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). In this
letter I go one step further on their appeal to framing eﬀects by representing test takers as using a
parametrized version of prospect theory, and choosing parameters so that test takers’ preferences
match real behavior in risky situations both in the laboratory and in real economic applications.
Guessing analysis using these ‘calibrated’ subjects singles out a rule which is ‘fair’ both from a
statistical viewpoint (by oﬀering a zero expected score for random guesswork) and is also neutral
from a strategic viewpoint, by leaving calibrated agents indiﬀerent between guessing at random
or omitting.3 Quite remarkably, for tests having 4 or 5 options per item this neutral rule almost
coincides with an old rule proposed in Traub et al. (1969) which, unfortunately, no major testing
program employs it. Of course, as more theoretical work and empirical evidence of this kind
accumulates, the situation may change.
2 To guess or not to guess
When facing an item in a multiple-choice test an examinee must choose wether to pick an answer
among M possible options (and perhaps risk losing points if the chosen answer turns out to be
incorrect) or to omit it, (a riskless option). In what follows, I shall restrict my attention to items
with a unique correct answer. Formally, let Ci (i =1 ,...,M) denote the event “the correct answer
is placed in the ith position”. Thus, C1,...,C M are disjoint events partitioning the set of states of
nature S.E v e n t sC1,...,C M are mapped into judged probabilities p1,...,p M where pi reﬂects the
probability that the examinee assigns to the event Ci. Probability judgements need not be additive,
but they do satisfy subadditivity, which implies p1 + ···+ pM ≥ 1, and binary complementarity,
which implies that the event NCi (denoting the complementary of Ci on S) is judged to have
probability 1 − pi (see Fox and Tversky (1998) and Wu and Gonz´ alez (1999), among others). If x
is the reward associated with a right response, y with an omission and z with a wrong response
(x>y>z ), the examinee is therefore facing the following decision tree:
1-p2 p2 1-pM pM 1-p1 p1
zx zx zx






























Figure 1A: One-person game in test taking.
3 And therefore drawing the line between capitalizing on chance and having partial knowledge, as Budescu and
Bar-Hillel asked for.
2Without loss of generality, I shall assume that there is one option which is judged to be the
most likely true. Any test taker whose preferences are monotone with respect to the relation of
ﬁrst order stochastic dominance will ﬁnd strategically equivalent the above tree to the reduced tree







Figure 1B: Reduced one-person game in test taking.
The examinee is required to choose either (A) which represents picking the answer with the
highest probability of being correct or (O) m e a n i n gt oo m i tt h eq u e s t i o n .B r a n c hA yields therefore
the prospect (x,C;z,NC)o ﬀering a subjective chance p of event C,o r1− p chance of NC,a n d
branch O yields y with certainty. In terms of outcomes and judged probabilities, if we set the
outcome of a correct answer, x, to be equal to 1, diﬀerent scoring rules are characterized by y
(0 ≤ y<1), the payoﬀ associated with the omission of items, and z (z<y ), the penalization
for wrong answers. For instance, the GRE general exam in the United States uses the Number of
Right (here denoted NR) rule, which sets y = z = 0, whereas the SAT examinations have been
employing the Standard Correction (here SC) rule, for which y =0a n dz = −1/(M − 1) where
M ≥ 2 is the number of possible answers for each item. A rational test maker endowed with
risk preferences represented by V will choose A whenever the value under V of the risky prospect
A =( x,p;z,1 − p) exceeds the value of the degenerate prospect O =( y,1), even if knowledge is
not perfect and answering involves some partial guessing.4 The proﬁtability of guessing is therefore
expressed as
V (A) − V (O)=V (x,p;z,1 − p) − V (y)
whose value depends on the utility theory employed.
The formulation of risk preferences in this article adopts the theoretical framework of Cu-
mulative Prospect Theory (CPT for short) in which gains and losses, rather than ﬁnal outcomes
are considered the carriers of value. CPT is a fairly general theory that lends itself very read-
ily to an examination of guessing in multiple-choice tests. It assumes a continuous strictly in-
creasing value function deﬁned over outcomes satisfying v(0) = 0, and two weighting functions,
4 A fact that is not always understood in education research. When penalization for wrong answers was ﬁrst
introduced in the SAT, examinees were simply instructed not to guess at all.
3w+ and w− for events leading to gains and losses respectively which are nondecreasing and sat-
isfy w+ (0) = w− (0) = 0 and w+ (1) = w− (1) = 1. According to CPT, whenever z ≤ 0,
prospect A can be written as the mixture of its positive part, A+ =( 1 ,p;0,1 − p)f o rw h i c h
V (A+)=w+ (p)v(1) + [w+ (1) − w+ (p)]v(0), and its negative part, A− =( 0 ,p;z,1 − p), for
which V (A−)=w− (1 − p)v(z)+[ w− (1) − w− (1 − p)]v(0). The value of prospect A is then
V (A)=V (A+)+V (A−) and therefore the condition for guessing is:
V (A) − V (O) > 0 ⇐⇒ w+ (p)v(1) + w− (1 − p)v(z) − v(y) > 0( 1 )
In order to accommodate a pattern of choices exhibiting risk seeking for gains and risk aversion
for losses of low probability combined with risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses of high
probability (the so-called fourfold pattern of risk attitudes5 ), Tversky and Kahneman suggested
(i) a value function that is concave for gains, convex for losses and steeper for losses than for gains,
and (ii) S-shaped weighting functions both for gains and for losses, so that small probabilities are
overweighted, whereas moderate and high probabilities are underweighted.
In accordance with the homogeneity of preferences observed in experimental research, Tversky
and Kahneman derive a two-part power function of the form
v(x)=
(
xα if x ≥ 0,
−λ(−x)β if x<0,
where λ controls the eﬀect of loss aversion, and can assume any positive value. The greater the
value of λ, the more pronounced loss aversion. In addition, parameters α and β control respectively
for the sensitivity of value to the size of positive and negative outcomes.
Tversky and Kahneman also suggest weighting functions for gains and losses that are ﬁrst
concave and then convex in p (overweighting low, and underweighting high probabilities). They
calibrate their model against experimental data using the following functional form, also suggested
in Camerer and Ho (1991, 1994):
w+ (p)=
pγ
[pγ +( 1− p)
γ]
1/γ and w− (p)=
pδ
h
pδ +( 1− p)
δ
i1/δ.
The calibration of the general ﬁve-parameter model for individual subjects appears in Tversky and
Kahneman (1992). The median values taken from their work appear in Table 1 below. Under
the additional assumption γ = δ, Camerer and Ho (1991) give their own mean estimate of this
weighting function using diﬀerent laboratory data. Bradley (2003) also assumes γ = δ and oﬀers
mean estimates of the ratios γ/α and γ/β using data from betting behavior in horse races.6 Table
1 summarizes these estimates.
5 See, for instance, Tversky and Wakker (1995) and the references therein.
6 Jullien and Salani´ e (2000) provide a diﬀerent calibration of CPT using data on gamblers at horse racing tracks.
Their model doesn’t allow for an estimation of the value function for losses, and therefore concentrate on how
4Table 1–Calibrations of the CPT model
Parameters: λ α β γ δ γ/α γ/β g h
Tversky and Kahneman: 2.25 0.88 0.88 0.61 0.69 - - - -
Camerer and Ho (γ = δ): - - - 0.56 - - - - -
Bradley (γ = δ): - - - - - 0.818 0.68 - -
Considering that the data of these studies come from diﬀerent sources and methodologies, the
values obtained are remarkably close. Notice that the estimates of Bradley and Camerer and Ho
together suggest a value of α around 0.69, and for β around 0.82. Thus the estimates of Tversky
and Kahneman seem quite robust to the use of ﬁeld data instead of laboratory choices. This paper
avoids the estimation problem altogether by utilizing the parameter set of Tversky and Kahneman.
Given these parameter values, it is possible to compute the value of guessing V (A)−V (O) for any
scoring rule
3 To correct or not to correct for guessing? And if so, how?
If the question “To guess or not to guess” must be faced by test takers, test makers must face the
question “To correct or not to correct for guessing?” In the no-correction option, the test maker
oﬀers examinees a dominant strategy and thus removes the penalty against more risk averse test
takers. If test makers expect examinees to be heterogeneous in their risk attitudes (because of
cultural background, for instance) it might be reasonable to settle for the NR rule and choosing
y = z = 0. If, however, examinees can be pictured as a single representative test taker holding
calibrated preferences, test makers should choose y and z in order to minimize the incentives for
pure random guesswork without hindering guessing in situations of partial knowledge.
Notice from inequality (1) that, in the context of CPT, the proﬁtability of guessing depends
positively upon w+ (p) and negatively on the degree of loss aversion. Thus, in the NR rule (y = z =
0), the value of guessing coincides with w+ (p). Since in the calibrated model w+ (1/M) > 1/M for
all integer M>2, the value of pure random guessing under CPT is higher than under expected
utility theory (assuming equal value function over outcomes).7
In the SC rule (y =0 ,z = −1/(M − 1)), the value of V (A) − V (O) is always negative for
probabilities of gains are weighted diﬀerently from probabilities of losses. They ﬁnd no evidence that weighting




h to ﬁnd a
slightly convex weighting function for gains and a concave function for losses. When used with Bradley’s data, Jullien
and Salani´ e’s estimations ( g =1 .162 and h =0 .318), yield a convex value function both for gains and for losses, in
sharp contrast with the other studies. Therefore, their results seem to be too context-speciﬁc for the purpose of this
paper.
7 This result holds in general for risk preferences satisfying lower subadditivity, which implies a concave weighting
function for low probabilities. There is widespread experimental evidence supporting this property, which implies
optimism for unlikely events (see Wakker (2001)). The reverse inequality holds, however, if M =2 .
5all relevant values of M.8 (see the plot in ﬁgure 2 below). Thus, the overweighting of small
probabilities is more than compensated by the strong loss aversion suggested by Tversky and
Kahneman’s calibration. In fact, loss aversion is so strong that omitting is the optimal strategy
even for quite high judged probabilities of success. For instance, for a typical value of the number
of options, M =4 ,t h el o w e s tv a l u eo fp that makes guessing proﬁtable is p =0 .469, which is almost
twice the objective chance of being right. The risk premium paid by calibrated agents is then close
to 90% of the objective chance of success. This seems too much risk premium for a reasonable
test. For other typical values of M the minimum judged probability that makes guessing proﬁtable
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Figure 2: The value of pure guessing under the SC rule.
.
Table 2–Minimum Judged probability for choosing Answering over omitting
(calibrated subjects)
M (Objective probability 1/M) 2 (0.500) 3 (0.333) 4 (0.250) 5 (0.200) 6 (0.166)
Standard Correction rule: 0.788 0.603 0.469 0.372 0.302
Table 2 says that adopting the SC rule as a way to avoid random guessing leads to unacceptable
costs imposed on the representative test taker, hindering his ability to make partial guesses. This
brings us back to the problem posed by Budescu and Bar-Hillel. Is there a fair rule incentivating
guessing if and only if the examinee has partial knowledge? By ‘fair’, I mean a scoring rule for
which one’s expected score is the same wether one guesses at random or omits, and thus returns a
expected score of zero to someone who knows nothing at all. The necessary condition for fairness










8 In fact, for the calibrated parameters, it becomes positive only when M>27. Thus, no SC test in real life oﬀers
incentives for pure random guessing.
6A scoring rule will be strategically neutral if guessing in a situation of partial knowledge is a
dominant strategy for the representative test taker whereas random guessing it is not. According to
this terminology, Budescu and Bar-Hillel were asking for a scoring rule both fair and strategically
neutral. Neither the NR rule nor the SC rule are strategically neutral. The NR rule oﬀers guessing
as a dominant strategy for any test taker with monotonic preferences, whereas in the SC rule the
representative test taker with calibrated preferences would choose omitting in a question for which
his judged probability of success lies between 1/M and the minimum value that makes guessing
proﬁtable (see again table 2).
Of course, within the expected utility framework there are no fair rules which are also strate-
gically neutral unless we allow the representative test taker to have a utility function with both
concave and convex regions. Within the CPT framework, however, the nonlinear transformation of
the probability scale leaves room for choosing a reward y and a penalty z implementing a rule which









































− v(y)=0 i fy ≥ 1/M.
Plugging Tversky and Kahneman’s calibrated parameters in, we get for any given value of M>2
the exact value of y which solves the condition above.9
Table 3–Reward for omitting in a fair and strategically unbiased rule
(calibrated subjects)
M (Objective probability 1/M) 2 (0.500) 3 (0.333) 4 (0.250) 5 (0.200) 6 (0.166)
fair and strategically neutral rule : - 0.882 0.257 0.191 0.149
Since most tests oﬀer at least four choices per item, the rewards for omitting that make a fair
rule strategically neutral are remarkably close to the rewards oﬀered by a rule in which there is no
penalization for wrong answers, i.e. z = 0, and the reward for omitted answers is y =1 /M,w h i c h
coincides with the expected value of guessing. This rule, which I dubbed the positive correction (PC)
rule, was proposed in Traub et al. (1969), and Budescu and Bar-Hillel (1993) point out empirical
evidence on test takers preferring this rule to the SC rule. Bereby-Meyer et al. (2002) also found
that the level of conﬁdence required to pick an answer (among M = 5 options) was lower under
the PC rule than under the SC rule. Notice that within our calibrated model, the proﬁtability of
9 If M = 2 (as in True/False questions) fairness implies that random guessing is a dominated strategy for calibrated
test takers.
7guessing is w+ (p)−v( 1
M), which is always positive if p ≥ 1/M and M>4 and negative if p ≤ 1/M
and M ≤ 4 (see Figure 3). Thus, this computations show that the PC rule is “almost” strategically
neutral: for M = 4, for instance, random guessing is a dominated strategy for the representative
calibrated test taker, but the same representative test taker will select any option with subjective








Figure 3: The value of pure guessing under the PC rule (black) compared with the value under
t h eS Cr u l e( g r a y ) .
Bereby-Meyer et al. suggest that loss aversion is the dominant force driving subjects’ choices
(as in Tversky and Kahneman’s calibrated preferences) while Traub et al. found a higher tendency
to omit under the PC rule. Since the proﬁtability of guessing for the PC rule is w+ (p) − v( 1
M),





, one should expect more guessing under
PC (as Bereby-Meyer et al.’s experimental data suggest) if v( 1






p ≥ 1/M, and less guessing (as Traub et al. suggest) if the reverse inequality holds. That would
b et h ec a s ei f ,f o rag i v e nM, the judged probability of mistake, 1 − p, is small (something we
expect to be associated with a high level of knowledge) and the test taker does not put too much
weight on this event. Therefore, for a given level of judged knowledge, test takers overweighting
small chances should behave closely to the way Bereby-Meyer et al. suggest, whereas test takers
who do not display this possibility eﬀect may behave closer to the way described in Traub et al.’s
experiments.
4C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
A traditional argument favoring the use of the standard correction-for-guessing rule in tests has
been an appeal–often implicit–to risk neutrality. The upshot of this work is that it conﬁrms that,
when we adopt a richer theory of choice, as I do here with prospect theory, the standard correction-
for-guessing clearly hurts high-ability subjects by inhibiting them from using signiﬁcant partial
information, or “hunches” (and then guessing advantageously). Once we identify loss aversion
8as responsible for this situation, one way out of the problem is to award partial score credit for
omitted questions rather than deduct score credit for wrong answers. The calibration presented
here supports this approach showing that, for natural values of the number of options per item
(usually four or more), the PC rule is close to a fair and strategically neutral rule.
At this point someone might question an item-by-item approach, and argue that a test is about a
collection of repeated decision problems and not an isolated one. Be that as it may, in the interplay
between single and repeated gambles it is crucial the role of framing, one of the psychological
basis of prospect theory. In particular “narrow framing”, the tendency for the subjects to treat
each gamble as a separate event rather than integrate the series of gambles into a distribution
of possible outcomes, has been not only extensively documented in experiments but it has also
proven itself useful in explaining data in ﬁnancial markets (Benartzi and Thaler (1995)). I can
see no reason why “myopic loss aversion” should work in markets but not in a test situation. If
myopic loss aversion holds, the bias against partial knowledge induced by the SC rule will not
change signiﬁcantly with the number of questions. This conjecture is supported by experiment 2
in Bereby-Meyer et al. (2002), which found no signiﬁcant eﬀect of the number of questions on the
level of conﬁdence required for answering.10
A perhaps more challenging problem which deserves further research is the tendency to over-
diversify choice in repeated choice problems under uncertainty.11 This eﬀect, together with the fact
that test makers show a tendency for hiding correct answers in middle positions12 might generate
distortions when going from the study of behavior in a single isolated item to answer sequences in
a battery of questions.
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